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RULE 10b-5 DEVELOPMENTS
A central purpose of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
rule 10b-5' is protection of the securities investor form unfair treatment
by persons possessing inside information of corporate affairs.2 The use of
inside information to trade for the personal benefit of the insider is a
breach of fiduciary duty.' A breach of fiduciary duty alone, however,
without deception or manipulation does not violate rule 10b-5.4 Converse-
ly, a misrepresentation or omission of fact, although deceptive, does not
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated rule 10b-5 in 1942 under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-.... (b) to use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
2 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackman, J.,
dissenting) (rule 10b-5 drafted to deal with situation in which corporate officer and director,
possessing inside information not available to ordinary shareholders, purchases stock from
shareholders at insufficient price); Note, Suits For Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule
10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1874, 1874 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Suits for Breach].
' E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
' Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). Manipulative conduct includes
practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices that are intended to
stimulate trading and create an unnatural and unwarranted appearance of market activity.
E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 43 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 199 (1976). Deceptive conduct includes fraudulent misstatements of fact, omissions
and concealment of information indicating the misleading nature of a prior statement. See,
e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (bank employees made
misstatements of material fact to purchase stock at less than fair value); Superintendent of
Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1971) (seller duped into believing that it
would receive proceeds); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D.
Tex. 1971), affd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971) (misleading statements or omissions are
fraudulent acts under rule 10b-5).
894 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
violate the rule if there is not duty to disclose.' Further, no action lies
unless the plaintiff is a purchaser or seller of securities.' In the past
year, lower courts7 have grappled with specific interpretations of rule
10b-5 in light of these broad demarcations.'
A. DUTY TO DISCLOSE
To effectuate the congressional goal of investor protection through
full disclosure,9 corporate insiders ' ° generally have a duty to disclose
material' nonpublic information or to refrain from using the information
for personal benefit." The duty to disclose arises, however, only when a
fiduciary relationship exists between the parties." Without a relation-
ship of trust and confidence, insider trading is not a violation of rule
I Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2(a) (1976).
1 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
SE.g., Falls v. Fickling, 621 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1980); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.,
619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 910 (D. Del 1980);
American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va.
1980).
, Recent Supreme Court decisions reversed a lower court trend of broadening a rule
10b-5 cause of action. See, e.g., Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)
(breach of fiduciary duty without deception not actionable under rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (plaintiff in private damage action under rule 10b-5
must prove scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738-39 (1975)
(private plaintiff must be purchaser or seller of security for rule 10b-5 cause of action). See
generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under Federal Securities Laws:
The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 892 (1977); Note, Judicial Retrenchment Under
Rule 10b-5: An End to the Rule as Law, 1976 DUKE L.J. 798, 790.
' Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 373 (3d Cir. 1956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953); 78 CONG. REC. 2770-71) (statement of Senator Fletcher) ('34 Act
designed to insure full disclosure to investors).
,0 Insiders are those persons who have specific information regarding a company's
securities that is unknown to otherwise knowledgeable investors. See Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Dooley]. In-
siders include corporate officers, directors, and controlling stockholders, Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961), and those persons who have regular access to confidential in-
formation. Id. at 907. Friends and relatives who knowingly acquire information also may be
insiders. See Dooley, supra, at 5.
"1 A fact is material if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable shareholder
would consider the fact important in making an investment decision. TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although Northway involved an alleged violation of
§ 14(a), courts have used this materiality standard in § 10(b) cases. E.g., Joyce v. Joyce
Beverages, Inc., 571 F.2d 703, 707 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978); Sunstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399, Comment c (1958); Dooley, supra note
10, at 21.
,1 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2(a) (1976).
[Vol. XXXVIII
RULE 10b-5 '
10b-5.' 4 In American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp.,5
the federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered
whether corporate insiders who do not trade for their own account have
a duty to disclose nonpublic information to minority shareholders.,'
American General Insurance Company (American) is a sophisticated
financial services corporation with a reputation for shrewdly acquiring
smaller insurance companies. 7 In 1977, American purchased ten percent
of the stock of Equitable General Corporation (Equitable), a small in-
surance company. 8 Because Equitable feared that American would at-
temp a hostile takeover, 9 Equitable sought to block American's acquisi-
tion efforts." In addition, Equitable began to search actively for a
merger partner which would negotiate with management." To facilitate
a potential merger, Equitable commissioned an actuarial appraisal of its
financial condition, which indicated an "intrinsic" value of forty-five
dollars per share of Equitable stock." Without knowledge of Equitable's
actuarial appraisal and search for a merger partner, and frustrated in its
own acquisition efforts, 3 American decided to sell its Equitable stock.'4
American offered to sell the shares to Equitable for thirty-two dollars
" Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980); General Time Corp. v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). Not every in-
stance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b). 445 U.S. at 232;
see Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977) (mere breach of fiduciary duty
without deception or manipulation not actionable under federal securities laws). Chiarella
rejected the view that any informational disparity between traders is fraudulent under rule
10b-5. See Dooley, supra note 10, at 5 n.14.
493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980).
, Id. at 743.
" Id. at 729.
" Id. at 730-31.
, Id. at 731. A hostile takeover is one in which the acquiring company eschews
negotiations with management of the target company and deals directly with the
shareholder. Id.; see note 21 infra.
'0 Id. at 731-32. Equitable contested American's efforts to gain approval of the Virginia
Corporation Commission to allow American to acquire more than a 10% interest in
Equitable. Id.; see VA. CODE § 38.1-178.1:2 (Supp. 1979) (Commission must approve any ac-
quisition of control of a domestic insurer); VA. CODE § 38.1-178.1(2) (Supp. 1979) (control is
presumed, inter alia, by holding 10% of voting securities).
" 493 F. Supp. at 732. Equitable wanted to find a "white knight," a merger partner
who negotiates the merger terms with management of the target company. Id. at n.19.
American, on the other hand, had a reputation as a "raider" who bypasses the incumbent
management to deal directly with stockholders. Id. Management favors a white knight
because the white knight woos management with offers of job security and other in-
ducements, whereas a raider does not. See generally E. ARONOW & H. EINHORN. TENDER OF-
FERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 221 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN].
1 493 F. Supp. at 732. "Intrinsic" value reflects the value of the shares upon a com-
plete sale of the company, not merely a 100-lot market price. Id.; see generally King v.
United States, 292 F. Supp. 767, 776-77 (D. Colo. 1968).
See note 19 supra.
493 F. Supp. at 733.
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and fifty cents per share.25 Meanwhile, Equitable had received two
merger offers of thirty-three dollars per share.28 Equitable accepted
American's offer without disclosing the mature merger offers." Before
closing the transanction, Equitable issued a press release which
appeared in the Wall Street Journal.28 The press release mentioned that
Equitable was engaged in "very preliminary and exploratory" merger
talks.29 American rigorously questioned a director of Equitable about
Equitable's merger activities, but the director convinced American that
Equitable was not merger prone, and that the press release was ac-
curate." Furthermore, the director offered a warranty which stated that
Equitable had not reached any understanding with any company regar-
ding merger. 1 American completed the sale upon the false assumption
that Equitable's merger interests were merely "preliminary."32 In fact,
Equitable's merger negotiations were serious and substantive.3 Six
months later, Equitable merged with Gulf United Corporation and
received fifty-one dollars per share. 4 American sued Equitable for viola-
tion of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
3 5
Id. at 733. American's president offered the stock to Equitable's president as a
courtesy to improve Equitable's attitude toward American in later dealings. Id American
offered to sell at $32.50 because American had received an offer for that amount from an in-
vestment banker. Id. Unknown to American, however, the banker represented Equitable.
Id. Neither the banker nor Equitable disclosed that the actuarial appraisal of Equitable
stock was $45.00. Id. American thought $32.50 was profitable since American purchased the
stock for $26.25. I& at n.21.
26 Id. at 733-34.
Id at 735.
Id. Equitable drafted the press release without notice to American and published it
in the Southwestern Edition of the Wall Street Journal on the morning the sale was to be
closed. IM American's management read the announcement and quickly began to reconsider
selling the stock to Equitable. Id at 736.
Md at 735-36.
I& at 736. Although American requested detailed information from the director for
two days, the director refused to enlarge upon the phrase "very preliminary and ex-
ploratory" to describe Equitable's merger prospects. Id




Id. at 728-29. American, incorporated in Texas, alleged that in addition to violating
rule 10b-5, Equitable, a Virginia corporation, violated a Virginia common law fiduciary duty
to shareholders, breached the terms of the warranty made by Equitable to American on the
sale, and violated provisions of the Texas Securities Act. Id. at 72-79.
Directors owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation's shareholders under Virginia law.
Wometco Enterprises, Inc. v. Norfolk Coco-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 528 F.2d 1128, 1129
(4th Cir. 1979); Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 215 Va. 782, 213 S.E.2d 774 (1975). The district
court found that the Virginia common law duty to shareholders did not encompass in-
dividual shareholders but arose only when directors dealt with shareholders as a class. 493
F. Supp. at 740-41 (citing Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 58, 158 A.2d 136, 140-43 (1960)).
Although Equitable's purchase was disadvantageous to American, the transaction bene-
fitted the shareholders as a class. 493 F. Supp. at 741 n.42. Since the nondisclosure did not
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At trial, American alleged two separate theories to support its con-
tention that Equitable violated rule 10b-5. First, American posited that
Equitable and its directors breached a fiduciary duty to disclose
material inside information before purchasing the stock from
American. 8 Second, American asserted that Equitable not only made
omissions of material fact but also incurred liability because of the affir-
mative misrepresentations made by Equitable's directors in the course
of the sale."
In addressing American's first theory, the court found that federal
securities laws impose a fiduciary duty upon insiders, but that insiders
breach the duty only when they trade for their own account." Although
the purchase of American's shares ultimately benefitted the majority
shareholders, including the defendants, the district court found that the
Equitable directors were not trading for their own account or with the
expectation of individual personal benefit." Since the directors did not
trade on their own behalf, the defendants owed American no fiduciary
duty, and the director's silence regarding the material merger informa-
tion did not violate rule 10b-5 °
Although the directors had no affirmative duty to disclose material
inside information, the American General court held the directors to a
duty of avoiding affirmative misrepresentations and of disclosing any in-
formation necessary to make previous statements accurate."' In accept-
harm all shareholders, Equitable had not violated any fiduciary duty under Virginia law. Id.
at 741.
Upon learning that Equitable had begun merger negotiations, American sought an
escalation agreement and an exemption from the Mutual Release of potential securities
claims inlcuded in the sale terms. 493 F. Supp. at 736; see text accompanying notes 28-30
supra. The Equitable director who was to close the deal refused American's demands, but
offered a warranty. Id. at 728 n.5; see text accompanying note 31, supra. The district court
found that Equitable's directors knew that the warranty's affirmative representations were
false and that Equitable therefore breached the warranty. Id at 741; see text accompanying
note 32 supra. The court held Equitable liable to American for breach of contract. 493 F.
Supp. at 747.
The Texas Securities Act establishes that a buyer of securities who fails to disclose a
material fact is civilly liable. TEX. CODE ANN. § 581-33(B) (Supp. 1978). The buyer may avoid
liability, however, if he proves that the seller knew of the untruth or omissions. Id.; 493 F.
Supp. at 748. The district court found both that Equitable knew of the falsehoods and that
American was unaware of the truth. Id at 750. Therefore, Equitable was liable under §
581-33(B). Id.




Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) and SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)).
SId. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) and SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)).
4! 493 F. Supp. at 744.
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ing American's offer, Equitable's president affirmatively represented
that Equitable was not engaged in merger negotiations and immediately
issued press release omitting any reference to other merger bargain-
ing.42 The Equitable director at the closing of the sale made further affir-
mative misrepresentations of the material facts of Equitable's merger
status." The district court held that once Equitable disclosed informa-
tion to American and the investing public, Equitable was under a duty to
insure that its representations were accurate and that any inaccuracies
were corrected immediately. 4 Because of the breach of this duty, the
court found the defendant directors and Equitable liable for violation of
rule 10b-5. 1
Although the American General decision correctly interprets exist-
ing case law, a seeming incongruity results from the court's imposition
of a duty to disclose accurate information after Equitable's misrepresen-
tations, irresprective of the existence of an earlier duty to disclose aris-
ing from Equitable's silence. The compromise between effective an-
tifraud protection and open-ended liability explains this apparent incon-
sistency. By its terms, rule 10b-5 does not state whether insider trading
constitutes a manipulative or deceptive device. 6 To protect investors,
courts have held those who trade on inside information liable for breach
of rule 10b-5 but only if the insiders violated a fiduciary duty to disclose
the material information." Balanced against the concern for investor
42 Id.; see text accompanying notes 28-30 supra (press release).
" 493 F. Supp. at 744-45; see text accompanying notes 30-32 supra (defendant
director's misrepresentations).
" 493 F. Supp. at 744-45.
41 Id. at 747. The court awarded the plaintiff rescissional damages of $3,622,500.00. Id.
at 766.
41 See note 1 supra (rule 10b-5); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (sec-
tion 10(b) does not state whether silence may be manipulative or deceptive device, but
broad interpretations of rule 10b-5 have imposed liability for insider trading).
11 E.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972); Davis v.
Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir. 1976); O'Neill v. Maytag, 399 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964);
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Note, Omission and Non-
disclosure Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Distinction In Search of a Difference, 7 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 423, 425 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Omission and Nondisclosure]. Liability can result
from the total silence of a defendant insider, but only if the insider trades for his own ac-
count and has a duty to disclose. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233
(1980) (no fraud under rule 10b-5 absent duty to speak); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (insider trading for his own account and personal benefit
violates rule 10b-5); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); Morrison, Silence Is
Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Market Information, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211, 217 (1980)
[hereinafter city as Morrision]. Unless a plaintiff alleges self-dealing and deception by a
director, the director may approve a purchase sale of stock without disclosing that the pur-
pose of the sale was to retain control of the corporation. E.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d'
764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964); 5A JACOBS. THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 5-89 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as 5A JACOBS]. At common law, a director or officer owed no fiduciary duty to a shareholder
in transactions of the corporation's stock absent fraud or misrepresentations. Cundick v.
Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 164 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968); H. HENN,
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protection, however, is the desire to circumscribe potentially limitless
liability.48 Neither party to an arm's-length transaction has an obligation
to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some con-
fidential or fiduciary relationship.49 Absent a fiduciary relationship, a
businessman has the right to capitalize on his experience and skill in
securing and evaluating information. 0 Congress, in enacting section
10(b), never intended to adopt a parity-of-information rule."' A different
situation arises, however, when one party makes affirmative representa-
tions. When a party makes misrepresentations, fraud replaces arm's-
length competition. Therefore, rule 10b-5 draws the line of liability at
the point where a nonfiduciary insider makes affirmative misstate-
ments.'2
Since the American General court explicitly found that the directors
were not trading for their own account," Equitable had no duty to break
the silence to volunteer information to American. 4 The court correctly
imposed liability upon Equitable for the affirmative misstatements
regarding Equitable's merger status. When Equitable chose to com-
municate with American despite the absence of a legal duty to do so,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 239 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as HENN]. On
the other hand, directors have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders if the directors' ac-
tions favor one group of shareholders over another. HENN, supra, at § 240. Directors may
use corporate funds to acquire corporate stock to defeat an attempted control bid by a
minority shareholder. Kors. v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 58, 158 A.2d 136, 140-41 (1960); Note,
Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 309 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Insurgent Shareholders]. The directors must not trade merely to main-
tain their own control, but must believe that the purchase will benefit the corporation as a
whole by removing an unsavory takeover threat. Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Co.,
33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295, 302 (1952; Insurgent Shareholder, supra, at 309-10. Manage-
ment may legitimately purchase shares of the corporation to avoid the cost of a proxy fight
with minority shareholders in defending management policy. Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47,
58, 158 A.2d 136, 141 (1960); Insurgent Shareholder, supra, at 311. In fact, directors have a
fiduciary duty to resist tender offers which, in the directors' judgment, are detrimental to
the corporation's best interests. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp.
706, 712 (N.D. 11 1969); ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 21, at 222.
See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
See generally Morrison, supra note 47, at 224.
&Id.
5' Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
See note 1 supra. (Clauses two and three of rule 10b-5 prohibit misrepresentations
and omissions of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of a security). A
party will be liable for a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a purchase or sale
even if no fiduciary relationship exists between the parties to the sale. See generally SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co:, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). The misrepresentations and omis-
sions must be of material information. Id.; see note 11 supra (standard of materiality). A
misrepresentation is an untrue statement, while an omission is a deficiency arising from the
failure to provide information to make a prior statement true. See note 11 supra (Rule 10b-5
definition); Omissions and Nondisclosure, supra note 47, at 424-25.
493 F. Supp. at 743; see text accompanying note 39 supra.
5 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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Equitable became liable for its untrue statements.55 Further, once
Equitable decided to release the information, it had an affirmative
obligation to release accurate information promptly. 6 Equitable did not
make an announcement which accurately reflected its merger status
until three months after closing the sale with American.-" The American
General court found a valid distinction between silence and misrepresen-
tations. American, as a sophisticated investor in an arm's-length transac-
tion, had the responsibility to evaluate the situation, relying on its own
expertise in light of Equitable's silence. When Equitable volunteered
false information, however, Equitable committed a fraud upon American
and violated rule 10b-5.19
B. RELEASE OF LIABILITY
Although parties to securities transactions often agree to the
predispute release of claims or to arbitration clauses,"0 courts strongly
disfavor executory agreements requiring extra-judicial resolution of
securities claims."' In response to the circumvention of early securities
legislation by boilerplate releases,62 section 14 of the Securities Act of
19333 and section 29(a) of the '34 Act 4 mandate that parties can release
E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (E.D. Pa.) modified, 83
F. Supp. 613 (1947); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD 70 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG & LOWENFELS]; Suits for Breach, supra note
2, at 1882 n.44. In Kardon, a case similar to American General, defendants purchased all of
plaintiffs stock in a corporation without revealing the existence of an agreement to sell the
corporation's assets for a higher price. 73 F. Supp. at 800-01. At the closing of the sale, when
the plaintiffs' attorney asked whether the defendants had made any agreement to sell the
stock, the defendants answered "No." Id. at 801. The affirmative misrepresentation violated
rule 10b-5. Id. at 800.
' See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) ("undue delay not in good faith" violates rule 10b-5);
SEC Comment on Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Exchange Act
Release No. 8995 (Oct. 15, 1970) (corporation "has an obligation to make a full and prompt
announcement of material facts regarding the company's financial condition"); 5A JACOBS,
supra note 50, at 4-3 to 4-4; Suits for Breach, supra note 2, at 1884.
s 493 F. Supp. at 736, 736 n.28.
See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra (businessman must rely on his own skill
unless fiduciary relationship exists).
" See note 55 supra (affirmative misrepresentation violates rule 10b-5).
See generally Krause, Securities Litigation" The Unsolved Problem of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements for Pendant Claims, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 693, 718-19 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Krause] (predispute arbitration clauses are "compulsory prerequisite"
for doing business in market).
E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp.
609, 624 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976).
6 See generally Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432, 435 (1953).
' 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976). Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976).
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only claims of which the parties have knowledge."' In Wilko v. Swan,"
the Supreme Court considered whether an arbitration clause violated
section 29(a) of the '34 Act." In deciding that the clause was invalid, the
Court emphasized that the statute does not bar a release or settlement
of an existing mature claim, but only prohibits anticipatory waivers of
compliance. 8 The circuits have adopted differing standards in assessing
whether the claim underlying the release is mature or anticipatory. 9
The Ninth Circuit holds that only claims of which the parties are aware
at the time of release is signed are sufficiently mature for the parties to
waive. 70 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit takes a more liberal approach.
That Circuit holds that a party may release not only known claims, but
also claims that reasonable inquiry would disclose.71
At trial, Equitable asserted that American signed a release of all
claims against Equitable and its directors, and that this release pre-
cluded any rule 10b-5 liability. The American General court followed
the Seventh Circuit and adopted a reasonable inquiry standard." In
adopting the reasonable inquiry standard, the American General court
stated that the standard achieves the proper balance between the
policies of the federal securities laws and the needs of judicial economy.74
Further, the court found that the reasonable inquiry standard would pro-
vide an incentive for plaintiffs to investigate the possibility of claims
before signing a release and, thus, would promote the informed signing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Id. at 430-31; Krause, supra note 63, at 702.
E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). In Wilko, the Supreme Court held that
a release of a claim infuturo is invalid because such a release contravenes Congress's policy
of investor protection through full disclosure, Id. at 430-31; Krause, supra note 60, at 702.
Congress intended to create a "special right" of protection of securities investors which can-
not be waived. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 430-31; Krause, supra note 60, at 702 (citing
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)).
"' Compare Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 403-05 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 939 (1979) (party may release not only known claims, but also claims that reasonable in-
quiry would disclose) with Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156, 174-75 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976) (only claims of which parties have knowledge at the time
the release is signed are waivable).
70 Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d at 175; see Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1964). In Royal Air Properties, the Ninth Circuit em-
phasized that waiver is the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Therefore, for a waiver to be effective, the releasing party must have knowledge of his
rights before he can relinquish them. Id.
"' Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 1978).
72 493 F. Supp. at 750.
Id. at 750-51.
' 493 F. supp. at 750 n.57; see note 68 supra (Congress, in enacting § 10(b), intended to
provide special protection of securities investors); Krause, supra note 60, at 694 (waiver or
arbitration is in best interest of investors as effective and inexpensive extra-judicial method
of dispute resolution).
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of a waiver and encourage honest settlement attempts.1 5 After adopting
the reasonable inquiry standard, the court examined the circumstances
surrounding the transaction to determine whether American could have
discovered Equitable's misrepresentations.7 6 The court found that
American exercised due diligence by questioning an Equitable director
immediately before the sale occurred." Since American's due diligence
indicated that the company had made a reasonable inquiry, the court
determined that the release was ineffective to bar Equitable's rule 10b-5
liability.78
Although the Seventh and Ninth Circuits disagree on the applicable
standard for determining the validity of a release,79 both circuits state
that their goal is to protect the innocent investor." Thus, the standards
of both circuits satsify the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress'
general policies in Wilko v. Swan." The Seventh Circuit's reasonable in-
quiry standard, adopted in American General, probably protects in--
vestors better than the actual knowledge standard. By encouraing an in-
vestor to conduct some investigation of the other party's claims, the
Seventh Circuit and American General diminish the possibility that a
,,willingly ingnorant" investor who blindly or careslessly speculates will
then seek a remedy in court."
" 493 F. Supp. at 750 n.57; see Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 1978);
Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"' 493 F. Supp. at 751. The Seventh Circuit only requires the plaintiff to prove that he
acted with due diligence in establishing that a reasonable inquiry would not have revealed
extant claims. Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 1978). This is not the same as
the proof of due diligence as an element of the substantive merits of a 10b-5 cause of action.
Id. The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1975) required a
10b-5 plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with scienter in perpetrating the fraud.
Courts have held that to require a plaintiff to prove both scienter and his due diligence to
avoid the fraud in his case-in-chief would be too great a burden. E.g., Goodman v. Epstein,
582 F.2d 388, 403 (7th Cir. 1978); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695 (10th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). The Seventh Circuit distinguished between the proof
of due diligence as a substantive element of the 10b-5 case and the requirement of proving
due diligence in a reasonable inquiry when the plaintiff has affirmatively acted to release
another party from any possible liability. Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d at 404. The Good-
man court stated that the mere fact that a party asks another to sign a release should put
the second party on notice that a reasonable inquiry should be made. Id.
The requisite degree of due diligence varies among the circuits. Compare Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014-20 (5th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff may recover unless reckless in inves-
tigating risk that is obvious or highly probable that harm will result), with Holdsworth v.
Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff's acts must be "gross conduct" to
establish lack of due diligence) and Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir.
1976) (plaintiff only required to act reasonably under circumstances).
493 F. Supp. at 751.
78 Id.
79 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
E.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 1978); Hughes v. Dempsey-
Tegeler & Co., Inc., 534 F.2d 156, 175 (9th Cir. 1976).
81 See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
See Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 1978) (reasonable inquiry stan-
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C. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Although mere breaches of fiduciary duty are not actionable under
the federal securities laws,"3 shareholders may bring a derivative action
under the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act when material deceptions
or manipulations accompany corporate over-reaching.8 4 Courts have had
difficulty, however, in defining what conduct is manipulative or decep-
tive.8" In Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc.,8 the Delaware district court
recently considered the disclosure requirements necessary to avoid rule
10b-5 liability in merger transactions.
Plaintiff Merritt was a shareholder in Colonial Foods, which merged
with Jobemo, a corporation organized to acquire all outstanding Colonial
shares."1 The Opatut family owned three quarters of the Colonial shares
and all of Jobemo's shares.88 Merritt alleged that he refrained from tak-
ing action to enjoin the merger because of untrue statements of material
fact contained in a tender document and a notice of the merger issued by
dard precludes failure of waiver defense when party executing waiver "kept his eyes closed
and therefore did not 'know.' ").
I Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1066 (1978). A shareholder derivative action permits a stockholder to assert a claim on the
corporation's behalf. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.1.16, 23.1.2. (3d rev. ed. 1979); Note, Rule 10b-5: The Circuits Debate the Exclusivity of
Remedies, the Purchaser Seller Requiremen and Constructive Deception, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 877, 896-907 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rule 10b-5] (discussing constructive
deception). Constructive deception is a term of art which refers to deception of a corpora-
tion by its majority shareholders. See generally Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 550-51
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (memorandum); Rule 10b-5, supra at 898; Suits for Breach, supra note 2, at
1883. Since a corporation may act only through its shareholders, officers, or directors,
deception of these persons acts as a fraud upon the entire corporation. E.g., HENN, supra
note 47, §§ 78-80; Sherrard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695, 699 (1978). When these persons act in their
own self-interest, however, the corporation's minority shareholders become the
corporation's decision-making body by default. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d
11, 26 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215,
220 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Suits for Breach, supra note 2, at 1883.
Therefore, any misrepresentation or omissions to the minority shareholders is a fraud upon
the corporation. E.g., Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Suits for
Breach, supra note 2, at 1883.
1 See note 1 supra (text of rule 10b-5). Manipulation involves intentional conduct
designed to defraud investors by controlling or affecting the price of a security. Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). For the purposes of rule 10b-5, deceptive con-
duct includes affirmative misrepresentations, omissions, and concealment of information
which would indicate that a prior statement was misleading. E.g. SEC v. National Banker's
Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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defendant majority shareholders.89 The plaintiff claimed that the tender
document contained nine misrepresentations and omissions, including a
failure to state the successful conclusion of another derivative suit
would result in a substantial increase in the book value of the corpora-
tion's shares, and a failure to include a statement of the financial reper-
cussions of the merger of the corporation. Merritt also alleged that the
tender document contained no notice that the merger would result in a
taxable event for shareholders, that the proposed merger lacked any
business purpose, and that the merger was a scheme to benefit the ma-
jority shareholders.' The plaintiff further contended that the notice of
merger contained misrepresentations and omissions that concealed the
facts that, inter alia, the merger lacked a valid business purpose and
that the price offered to the shareholders was "grossly" inadequate.92
The district court found that the plaintiff's allegations fell into two
distinct categories.93 The first category of allegations involved
misrepresentations and omissions which essentially were a failure to
confess corporate wrongdoing. The court held that statements of this
kind were not deceptive or manipulative and, thus, were not actionable
under federal securities laws. 4 The court found that the allegations that
the merger lacked any valid business purpose, that the merger was a
scheme to benefit the majority shareholders, and that the price offered
to shareholders was inadequate failed to state a rule 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion. 5 The second category of allegations concerned statements which
might affect the shareholder's investment decision of whether to accept
the offer or attempt to block the merger. The court found that the
failure to inform the shareholders of the possibility of a substantial in-
crease in the book value of the shares from a successful conclusion of the
other derivative suit, the failure to include a financial statement, and the
failure to inform the shareholders of a possible tax liaiblity to the
shareholders if the merger were successful were all misrepresentations
and omissions which stated a cause of action under rule 10b-5. 7
The Supreme Court has determined that Congress did not expressly
or implicitly provide a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. 8 The
Court reasoned that judicial creation of such a cause of action would ex-
ceed the congressional mandate and thrust federal courts into an area
traditionally reserved to state law.9 The district court in Merritt
8 Id. at 911-12.
' Id. at 912.
91 Id.
,2 Id. at 913.









recognized that some of the plaintiff's claims merely alleged a failure to
confess corporate wrongdoing, a claim actionable under state law, and
therefore, did not state a federal cause of action."' The availability of a
state injunctive remedy, however, does not preclude a federal claim.10 1 A
breach of fiduciary duty is actionable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 if
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure occurred. 2 The Merritt
court, however, did not investigate whether the claims arose from decep-
tion, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure. The court assumed that these
elements existed and focused its analysis on the materiality' of omis-
sions and misrepresentations. 4 Finding that the second category of
omissions included in the plaintiff's complaint had a direct bearing on
the investment decisions of the shareholders, the court determined that
the omissions were material and stated a federal claim.'05
By determining a federal cause of action on the basis of materiality
rather than deception, the Merritt court implicitly lowered the
plaintiff's burden of proof of misrepresentation in contradiction of the
Supreme Court's intent."0 After Merritt, a plaintiff with a claim under
state law could achieve standing to sue in federal court, not by proving
that the defendant violated rule 10b-5 by his misrepresentations or omis-
sions, but by a showing of materiality. The Merritt decision provides
clarity, however, in constructive deception suits. The "confusion of cor-
100 499 F. Supp. at 914; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (Con-
gress did not intend § 10(h) to regulate internal corporate mismanagement).
Iol E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer
Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 249 (7th Cir. 1977).
103 E.g., Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
103 See note 11 supra (definition of materiality).
114 499 F. Supp. at 914.
"I1 Id. Unlike other merger cases, the defendants in Merritt clearly committed fraud
and deceit upon the plaintiff minority shareholders through their misrepresentations. Com-
pare Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) and Beisenbach v. Guenther,
588 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1978) with Healey v. Catylist Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641,
646 (3d Cir. 1980) and Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1977). In Santa Fe,
the Supreme Court reviewed Delaware merger law to determine whether the defendant
had omitted any requisite information. The Court determined that all relevant information
was fairly represented by the defendant management. 430 U.S. 474. In Beisenbach, the
defendant directors made loans to the corporation on terms which were 4% above the prime
rate of interest and were to be repaid in shares of the corporation. 588 F.2d at 400. The
Third Circuit declined to classify the directors' mistakes in calculating the interest rate and
the directors' failure to confess the mistakes as deceptive conduct. Id. 402. In Healey, the
defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with information concerning the acquiring com-
pany's future plans and the names of the acquirer's board members. 616 F.2d at 643. The
Third Circuit found that misrepresentations and omissions were material and that the
material misrepresentations deprived the minority of the opportunity to enjoin the merger
under state law. Id. at 646-47. The Second Circuit in Goldberg found that a defendant parent
company's undisclosed sale of overvalued assets for stock of a controlled subsidiary was a
material misrepresentation or omissions. 567 F.2d at 220-21.
11 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (absent proof of decep-
tion, misrepresentation or nondisclosure, no federal cause of action stated).
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porate wrong-doing" standard107 furnishes a clear line of demarcation
between actionable and nonactionable claimed under rule 10b-5.
D. CHURNING
Although section 15 of the '34 Act °8 grants the SEC power to
regulate broker-dealers, the Commission has consistently used rule
10b-5 to augment its regulation."9 The Commission justifies this use of
rule 10b-5 by the "shingle theory.""' A broker is a fiduciary to his
customer,' and under the shingle theory, the broker must deal with his
customers fairly and honestly. " ' By "hanging out his shingle" the broker
impliedly represents that he will trade for a customer's account only to
the extent of the customer's authorization."' Brokers and dealers may
defraud their customers and violate the shingle theory by churning.
Churning occurs when a broker-dealer engages in trading activity in a
customer's account to generate commissions for the broker, and the ac-
tivity is excessive in light of the customer's investment objectives and
financial situation.14
" See text accompanying notes 94-95, 100 supra (failure to confess corporate wrong-
doing does not state rule 10b-5 cause of action).
1*1 5 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1).
119 See generally Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971); Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 5, at 2:33-2:34.
1' See generally S. JAFFEE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 307 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFEE]; Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869,
870-71 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Churning].
"' Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944); JAFFE, supra note 110, at 307.
See generally JAFFEE, supra note 110, at 307; Churning, supra note 110, at 870-71.
" Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943); Duker & Duker, 6
S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939); N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS,
DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS, Jq 2.03, 2.11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WOLFSON,
PHILLIPS & RUSSO].
'. E.g., Dzentis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 170-71
(10th Cir. 1974); Fey v. Walson & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); WOLFSON, PHILLIPS
& RUSSo, supra note 113, 2.11. Churning violates both rule 10b-5 and rule 15cl-2. See
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1943); JAFFE, supra note 110, at 127
& 137. Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15ci-2 (1980), promulgated by the SEC under 15(c)(1) of
the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976) prohibits:
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person ... [and] any untrue statement of a material fact and
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, which statement or omission is made with knowledge or reasonable
grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1980). For a comparison of rule 15cl-2 and rule 10b-5 antifraud provi-
sions, see BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 55, §§ 2.1, 2.3; 5A JACOBS, supra note 47, §
3.02(f).
A related concept, the "suitability doctrine," holds that a customer may rely on his
broker to invest only in those securities which are suitable to the degree of risk which the
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In Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co.," 5 the Ninth Circuit recently con-
sidered the elements of proof in a churning action. Plaintiff Mihara, an
aerospace engineer with ten years' investment experience, invested
$30,000 by opening a margin account"' with a branch of defendant Dean
Witter."7 Mihara claimed that because of his concern about his family's
financial security and his daughers' education in light of the aerospace
industry's layoff record, he wanted reliable financial expertise and safe
investments."8 Conversely, the defendant broker claimed that Mihara
was not concerned about a layoff, that he was interested in growth, and
that Mihara was knowlegeable about margin accounts and broker call
rates."' The broker recommended that Mihara make purchases of stock
in double-knit fabric companies.12 0 Although the broker consulted Mihara
prior to all purchases, Mihara's account made speculative investments,
numerous purchases and sales, and lost a total of $46,464.122 The broker
received a cumulative total of $12,672 in commission.1 23 After complain-
ing to his broker, as well as Dean Witter's local and regional office
managers, Mihara filed suit.12 4 Following a jury trail, the court held the
defendant liable for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of rule 10b-5."5
A plaintiff must prove several elements to establish a
broker-dealer's liability for churning. First, the plaintiff must show that
the broker induced activity in the plaintiff's account which, considering
the character and financial situation of the account, was excessive in
volume and frequency. 26 Second, the plaintiff must prove that the
broker had control over the account." Third, the broker must have
customers are willing to assume. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-
Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 448-49 (1965). The doctrine is com-
parable to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose imposed by § 2-315 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 452. A seller of goods warrants the goods if he has reason
to know the particular purpose for which the goods are acquired and when the buyer relies
on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing goods which are suitable for that
purpose. Id.
115 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
"I A margin account is a method by which brokers extend credit to customers to pur-
chase securities. See generally JAFFE, supra note 110, at 327. An investor must pay a por-
tion of the price upon ordering and remit the full price within seven business days from date
of purchase. Id. at 328. Margin accounts are used principally for speculation. See id. at 327.
11 619 F.2d at 817.
I's Id.
119 Id.
' Id. at 817-18.
121 Id. at 817.
!1 Id. at 817-18.
Id. at 819.
, Id. at 818.
12 Id. at 817. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $24,600 and assessed
punitive damages of $66,666 against Dean Witter & Co. and $2,000 against the defendant
broker. Id.
12 E. H. Rollins and Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945); JAFFE, supra note 110, at 308.
' Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970); JAFFE, supra note
110, at 308.
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acted with the intent to defraud or in reckless disregard of the interests
of the client.' The defendant may escape liability by proving waiver,
laches or estoppel as defenses.'29
Courts have developed several methods to determine whether the
broker excessively traded in an account in order to obtain commissions
rather than benefit the customer.' Because the sophistication, financial
resources, and investment objectives of customers vary, courts must
determine whether a broker churned an account on a case-by-case
basis.'31 One factor which courts consider is the ratio of commissions to
the size of the account.'32 Courts also use the "turnover rate" to deter-
mine excessive account activity.133 The turnover rate, computed by
dividing the cost of purchases in the account over a period by the
average investment in the period, shows how many times in the period
the customer's securities have been replaced by new securities.34 Courts
have established no minimum turnover rate or commissions-to-size
ratio. '5 A third method in determining whether churning occurred ex-
amines individual purchases and sales in an account. 3' A fourth test ex-
amines the length of time individual securities are held in the account. A
short length of time reflects poorly on the integrity of the broker's
recommendation, raising an inference that if the broker's orginial judge-
ment were sound he would not have traded so quickly. 137 A fifth test
weighs the quality of the securities in the account against the customer's
investment goals. "'
In determining whether the broker had traded Mihara's account ex-
cessively, the court focused primarily on the turnover rate test.'
Although testimony was available in the record to apply the other tests
" Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); JAFFE, supra note 110, at 308.
11 Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970); JAFFE, supra note
110, at 316.
11 See generally JAFFE, supra note 110, at 308.
131 Id.
132 Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294, 299 (1957).
"I Id. at 297.
134 Id.; JAFFE, supra note 110, at 309.
" JAFFE, supra note 110, at 309-10. Courts will weigh the turnover rate against the
plaintiff's financial circumstances, e.g., First Securities Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 591 (1961), and
the customer's investment objectives, e.g., Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202,
1207 (9th Cir. 1970).
11 E.g., Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 325 (1948). To achieve a high level of account
activity to generate commissions, a broker must "switch" or sell securities already in the ac-
count to generate proceeds for new purchases. JAFFE, supra note 110, at 310-11.
' JAFFE, supra note 110, at 311.
' Id. The suitability doctrine requires that a broker invest only in those securities
which are suitable to the degree of risk which the customer is willing to assume. See note
114, supra.
" Id. at 821; see text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
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of excessive trading,140 the Ninth Circuit stated that a turnover rate of
six reflects excessive trading, and mentioned the holding period test
only in passing.'' The court found that in the first year that Dean Witter
handled the plaintiff's account, the broker turned over the average
monthly investment more than nine times, and that the broker held over
fifty per cent of the stock for fifteen days or less.
4 2
When the customer is naive or unsophisticated, a court is more
likely to find that the broker controlled the trading in the customer's ac-
count if the investor can prove reliance upon the expertise of the
broker.' Even when the customer is relatively sophisticated and
granted no formal discretionary authority to the broker, the court may
find control if the customer regularly followed the broker's advice.' An
experienced customer who regularly makes his own investment deci-
sions, however, will have difficulty proving that the broker controlled
the account. 4 ' Courts require the plaintiff to prove that the broker acted
with scienter in perpetrating the fraud scheme.' Most courts consider
reckless disregard of the injured party's rights sufficient to satisfy the
scienter element.
147
"1 619 F.2d at 819, see text accompanying notes 140-48, supra. For example, while the
broker earned $12,672 in commissions, the average size of Mihara's account was approxi-
mately $39,000, 619 F.2d at 819, making the ratio of commissions to size of account almost 1:3.
See text accompanying note 132, supra. The plaintiffs expert testified that the double-knit
stocks recommended by the defendant were rated as high risk with below average financial
strength. 619 F.2d at 819. These stocks would be unsuitable for an investor with conser-
vative investment goals, as claimed by Mihara. See text accompanying notes 117 & 138
supra. No testimony was given to allow application of the individual purchases and sales ex-
amination.See text accompanying note 136, supra.
" 619 F.2d at 821.
"' Id. at 819. Between January 1971 and July 1973, the broker turned over Mihara's
average monthly investment of $36,653 approximately 14 times. Id. In 1971, Dean Witter
turned over the plaintiffs average capital investment of $40,000 approximately 9.3 times.
Id. Mihara's investment in 1972 was $39,800 and the broker turned that amount over 3.36
times. Id. In 1971, the holding periods of Mihara's stock were short. The broker held 50% of
the securities for 15 days or less, 61% for 30 days or less, and 76/o for 60 days or less. Id.
From January 1971 to July 1973, Dean Witter held 81.6/0 of Mihara's securities for 180
days or less. Id.
" E.g., Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 838-39 (E.D. Va. 1968);
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811, 844-49 (1965); WOLFSON, PHILLIPS & Russo, supra
note 113, 2.11.
"' E.g., Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970); WOLFSON,
PHILLIPS & Russo, supra note 113, 2.11.
",' E.g., Powers v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 344 F. Supp. 429, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
WOLFSON, PHILLIPS & Ross, supra note 113, 2.11.
14' E.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978); Carroll v. Bear, Stearns
& Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). All plaintiffs proceeding under § 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 must prove that the defendant acted with scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
11 E.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1046 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
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The Mihara court found that the broker exercised control over the
account, noting that Mihara routinely followed the broker's recommen-
dations.'48 The court viewed the broker's conduct as indicating reckless
disregard for the client's investment concerns, thus fulfilling the
scienter requirement."" The defendant argued that the plaintiff must
prove an intent to defraud on each trade made by the broker.5 ' The
court disagreed and held that since churning was a scheme to defraud, a
plaintiff need only prove that the broker generally had scienter
throughout the churning scheme. 5'
Churning usually occurs over a period of one to several years.' Dur-
ing this time, the broker must send the customer purchase and sale con-
firmations for each transaction.'53 An issue thus arises of whether the
plaintiff, by failing to object to the broker's conduct, has waived any
rights, created an estoppel, or by laches barred himself from recovery."
The defenses are easier to plead than to establish."' If the customer is
unsophisticated the defenses are unavailable."'
Although Mihara regularly received confirmation slips from his
broker, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's rejection of the defenses of
waiver, estoppel, and laches."' The court reasoned that even though the
confirmation slips informed Mihara of the specific transactions made, the
slips were not sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice that the trading his
account was excessive."s8 The confirmation slips indicated only the
suitability of the stocks purchased.59 Further, the Mihara court found
that the plaintiff's repeated complaints to Dean Witter management
about the handling of his account provided ample evidence to block the
defenses. 6 '
The fact that the Mihara jury found the broker guilty of churning
despite evidence that Mihara had been interested in growth stocks and
was knowledgeable about the stock market.' illustrates that a court
must be subjective in a churning case. The need for flexible interpreta-
tions of fact makes the Ninth Circuit's objective standard of a turnover




152 See JAFFE, supra note 110, at 316.
153 Id.
154 Id.
11 Id. at 317.
1w E.g., Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1970); JAFFE, supra
note 110, at 317-19.
II? 619 F.2d at 822.
11 Id. (citing Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970)). Thd
Hecht court found that individual confirmation slips do not fully indicate the excessive
trading of the account to the plaintiff. Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d at 1210.
159 619 F.2d at 822; see note 114 supra (suitability doctrine).
619 F.2d at 822.
181 Id. at 817, 820.
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rate of six to reflect churning unusual.'62 The turnover rates in cases in
which courts have found churning vary widely.' Only when the court
balances the objective elements against the customer's need and in-
vestment objectives can the court determine the broker's guilt.6 4 The
weighing of subjective elements is necessary to maintain the "uneasy
balance" established in churning actions.' On one hand, the securities
dealer in an investment counselor dispensing advice. The customer's
reliance on the broker's advice will be detrimental if the dealer trades
for his own interest. 6 On the other hand, the dealer is a salesman whose
profits depend upon his volume of sales.6 7 Therefore, a court must con-
sider the totality of the circumstances, rather than merely a single objec-
tive factor, to determine correctly whether a broker churned an
account.' Under the Mihara decision, an ambitious investor may be able
to speculate, achieve a turnover rate above six and then proceed against
his broker for churning. Conversely, a broker could make excessive
trades for his own profit, yet avoid liability under rule 10b-5 if the turn-
over rate did not reach six. In future decisions, the Ninth Circuit should
avoid setting arbitrary objective standards and return to a more subjec-
tive balancing of factors to determine churning.
E. CAUSATION AND PURCHASER-SELLER REQUIREMENT
When deceptive conduct accompanies a sheriff's sale of stock, unique
problems arise when litigating that conduct. In Falls v. Fickling,'6 ' the
'. E.g., Sierga & Co., Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 10207 (June 7, 1973); First Sect. Corp., 40
S.E.C. 589, 591 (1961); Walter S. Grubbs, 28 S.E.C. 323, 329-30 (1948); WOLFSON, PHILLIPS &
Russo, supra note 113, 2.11 (excessive trading not determined by set formula); 5A Jacobs,
supra note 47, at 9-96 (No mathematical formula can establish churning because subjective
consideration of customer's needs and resources and the character of amount must override
objective factors).
"1 Compare, e.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 7743, at 30-31 (Nov. 12,
1965) (turnover rate of eight times a month) with Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paines, 288
F. Supp. 836, 842 (E.D. Va. 1968) (two turnovers in twelve months) and J. Logan & Co., 41
S.E.C. 88, 94, 97 (1962), affd per curiam sub nom. Hersh v. SEC, 325 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964) (3.03 turnovers in twenty-three months).
'" See Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th
Cir. 1974) (no single rule to determine churning); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1045
(7th Cir. 1974) (court must balance extent of trading against investment goals of customers);
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Sup. 836, 846 (E.D. Va. 1968) (court must weigh
customer's financial condition or expressed goals and character of account against totality of
circumstances to determine if account churned). Prior to Mihara, the Ninth Circuit also
recognized that the determination of churning is a subjective balancing. See Hecht v. Har-
ris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 317, 432, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1968) modified on other grounds, 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (no single formula to determine churning, court must look at
customer's needs, objectives, and nature of account).
" See JAFFE, supra note 110, at 307; see generally Churning, supra note 110, at 870.
.. JAFFE, supra note 110, at 306; Churning, supra note 110, at 870.
.67 JAFFE, supra note 110, at 306; Churning, supra note 110, at 870.
1 See note 164 supra.
1" 621 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Fifth Circuit recently considered whether the mechanics of a forced sale
satisfy the materiality and purchaser-seller elements of a rule 10b-5
cause of action. The court determined that a sheriff's sale comes within
the '34 Act's definition of sale 170 and therefore satisfies the purchaser-
seller requirement of rule 10b-5. 1 The court further concluded that a
defendant's deceptive conduct can violate the rule even though the plain-
tiff is forced to sell.
1 7 2
Plaintiffs Falls pledged his shares of Charter Medical Corporation
(Charter) as security for two promissory notes payable to the defen-
dants.7 1 The defendants, a director-shareholder and a president and
largest stockholder of Charter, obtained a judgement against Falls upon
default on the note.1 7 4 The sheriff levied upon the stock to satisfy the
judgement and set a date for a sheriff's sale.1 75 The parties negotiated
the stock sale for several months before the sheriff's sale, but could not
reach an agreement.Y1 7 Falls attended the sale with $100,000 to ensure
that his shares would sell for a fair price. Immediately before the sale,
Fickling offered to bid four dollars per share. Fall rejected this price but
accepted an offer of four dollars and fifty cents per share in return for
his agreement not to bid on the shares.7 7 The Ficklings then purchased
the shares at the sheriff's sale in accordance with their settlement with
Falls. "' 8 Two days after the sheriff's sale Charter announced an offer of
an exchange of each share of common stock for a share of preferred
stock valued at seven dollars.7 Falls sued the Ficklings under rule 10b-5
alleging that the Ficklings owed Falls a fiduciary duty as a minority
shareholder and that they breached that duty by purchasing Falls' stock
without disclosing inside information concerning the impending sales of-
fer. 80 The trial court dismissed Falls' claim for failure to state a cause of
action, reasoning that since the sale was a forced process and not volun-
tary, Falls was not a seller of the stock. 81
170 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1976). Section 3(14) of the '34 Act defines "sale" and "sell" as
including "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Id.
' 621 F.2d at 1365.
172 Id. at 1367.
171 Id. at 1363.
'7' Id. The judgement against Falls was for $89,567.19. Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1363-64.
177 Id. at 1364.
178 Id. The final settlement before the sheriffs sale was for $90,716.14, the total judg-
ment against Falls plus interest and costs. Id. n.5. The settlement included a mutual release
of all claims arising from acts occuring before the settlement. Id.; see text accompanying
notes 60-71 supra (enforceability of general releases in securities cases).
179 621 F.2d at 1364.
180 Id.
... Id. at 1364-65. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's requirement that
only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring a cause of action under 10b-5. Id., citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
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On appeal, the defendants contended that Falls was not a seller*
because Falls already had disposed of his interest in stock by defaulting
on the pledge and, therefore, the sheriff's sale was merely a formality.'82
The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendafit's theory and found that
whether forced or not, a sale occurred. 8 ' In support of this decision, the
court looked to the laws of the state in which the sale occurred. Under
the law of Georgia, a sheriff is the agent of a forced seller and all pro-
ceeds of the sale belong to the defendant.184 The Falls court reasoned
that if a transaction is a sale under state law, a court should not adopt a
more restrictive test under the federal securities laws.' Therefore, the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was a seller entitled to assert a rule
10b-5 cause of action. 8
The defendants claimed that even'if Falls technically were a seller,
the defendant's conduct did not harm the plaintiff since, as a forced.
seller, the plaintiff had no decision to influence.'87 The Falls court re-
jected this contention, finding that the plaintiff did have some discretion
since he could have purchased the stock himself."' The court distinguish-
ed an Eighth Circuit case on which the defendants relied.'89 In that case,
a shareholder sold stock pursuant to a prior stock option agreement
made without fraud.' According to the terms of the agreement, both
the price and date of sale were fixed. The shareholder could do nothing
to block the sale of the stock."' The Falls court stated that unlike the
Eighth Circuit case, and no matter what the theory were -labeled,
whether "causal nexus," "reliance," or "materiality," the Ficklings' omis-
sions affected the plaintiff's decision not to purchase the stock.' The
court also reasoned that full disclosure of the impending exchange'offer
.would have increased the amount that the plaintiff received, since
anyone aware of the sheriff's sale would have bid at the sale."3 Com-
' 621 F.2d at 1365-66.
" Id. at 1365.
"' Id. at 1365 n.12; Dupriest v. Bennett Bros., 61 Ga. App. 704, -, 7 S.E.2d 293, 294
(1940); Lowe v. Ralins, 83 Ga. 321, -_, 10 S.E. 204, 204 (1889); See GA. CODE ANN. § 39-1307
(1975) (proceeds of sale belong to defendant).
621 F.2d at 1365 n.12.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366-67.
' Id. at 1367.
"' Id. at 1366-67 (citing St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977)).
"' St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d
1040, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 1977).
"' Id. at 1050 n.15.
621 F.2d at 1368.
", Id. at 1367-68. The defendants claimed that the $4.50 per share received by Falls was
the price of the stock on public exchanges and, therefore, the plaintiff received fair market
value. Id. The court dismissed this argument as "patently false," reasoning that if the argu-
ment were accepted, any insider trading in violation of rule lOb-5 could claim that the
defrauded party to the sale had received fair market value before the information became
public. Id. at 1369.
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petitive bidding would have driven the price per share to a value which
reflected the omitted information. 194 Finding that the plaintiff stated a
10b-5 cause of action, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.'95
Although the Falls court couched its reasoning in terms of causation,
the court should have focused on materiality. Causation is presumed
when a plausible relation exists between the defendant's deception and
the plaintiff's loss. 99 Therefore, the plaintiff need prove only
materiality.'97 A misrepresentation or omission is material if disclosure
would have significiantly altered the total mix of information available
to a reasonable investor.'98 This standard implicitly presumes that, if
disclosure of the withheld information is made, the reasonable investor
has an available alternative to sale.1 9 Since the Fifth Circuit required
Falls to prove that he had discretionary alternatives with respect to the
price of the stock at the sheriff's sale,0 0 the proper focus was on the
issue of whether the omissions were material.
By finding that the sherriff's sale is a sale for federal securities law
purposes because the proceeding is a sale under state law, the Fifth Cir-
cuit imposed an incorrect relationship between federal and state law.
Congress intended that the federal securities acts provide broader
causes of action and remedies than available under state common law.'0'
The securities acts determine whether a transaction is a sale securities
acts purposes.'
A recent Supreme Court case may call into question the Fifth Cir-
cuit's analysis of whether a sale occurred. In Rubin v. United States,'
the Supreme Court held that a pledge of securities constitutes a sale for
the purposes of the '33 Act.0 4 The Court found that a pledgor gives an in-
194 Id. at 1368.
1 Id. at 1371.
' Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970).
197 Id.
198 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
I E.g., Fershtman v. Schechtman, 450 F.2d 1357, .1360-61 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1066 (1972); Rule 10b-5, supra note 84, at 901-02.
621 F.2d at 1367.
221 See generally BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 55, § 2.7(1).
20 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1976).
101 S. Ct. 698 (1981).
Id. at 700-02. Rubin considered only whether a pledge of securities was a sale under
§ 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Rubin v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701
(1981). The Rubin decision probably applies to § 10(b) of the '34 Act, since courts construe
the '33 and '34 Acts as one body of law. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967); Lin-
coln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979). In addition, courts directly
recognize that a pledge is included within the '34 Act's definition of a sale. E.g., Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1979); Mallis v. FDIC, 568 F.2d 824,
829 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1977). The
definitions of "sale" in the '33 and '34 Act are different. The '33 Act defines a sale as a con-
tract for disposition of a security or interest in a security, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976), while the




terest in the pledged securities to the pledgee and that the '33 Act does
not require full title to pass from transferor to transferee to constitute a
"sale."2 5 Since courts construe the '33 and '34 Acts as one body of law,08
the question arises that if the "sale" of the securities acutally took place
at the time of the pledge, the Ficklings would not have violated rule
10b-5 since Falls had alleged no deception "in connection with" the
pledge. The Court's reasoning in Rubin suggests that this question will
not preclude rule 10b-5 liability.0 7 Since a pledge passes an interest in
the security to the pledgee, the pledgor disposes of part of his interest at
the pledge and the remainder at any later sale.20 8 Therefore, the pledgee
would be liable under rule 10b-5 for any fraudulent misrepresentation of
omissions made both at the pledge and at any later sale.00 Under this
analysis, Falls "sold" his securities at the pledge by disposing of part of
his interests in the securities to the pledgees, the Ficklings. Falls retain-
ed title in the securities, however, so that he "sold" the remainder of his
interest at the sheriff's sale. The Ficklings would then be liable under
rule 10b-5 for any misrepresentations or omissions made at either the
pledge or the sheriff's sale. In light of Rubin, the Fifth Circuit's deter-
mination in Falls is correct.
JEFFREY C. PALKOVITZ
Rubin v. United Staes, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701 (1981) (citing United States v. Gentile, 530
F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976)). In Gentile, the Second Circuit found
that a pledgee of securities assumed an investment risk substantially similar to that assum-
ed by an investor who purchases securities. United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 467 (2d
Cir. 1976). Since both pledgee and investor are speculating that the securities will have a
continuing value, the federal securities laws should protect the pledgee as well as the in-
vestor. Id. But see National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d
1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal securities laws intended to protect investors, not pledgee.
"Pledgee, unlike a securities purchaser, has a remedy on the note itself against makers and
guarantors.").
See note 204 supra.
Rubin v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701 (1981).
Id. Rubin conforms with the common law. Under common law, upon pledge, the in-
terest in the collateral was split with the pledgor retaining title and incidences of ownership
such as voting rights and the right to receive dividends, while the pledgee receives posses-
sion. E.g., National Bank of Commerce of Dallas v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295,
1300 (5th Cir. 1978); Note, Applicability of Rule 10b-5 to Pledges of Securities, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 547, 548 (1980).
1 Rubin v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 698, 702 (1981).
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